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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
W. P. HARLIN CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY,
vs.

THE CONTINENTAL BANK &
TRUST CO.,
Cross Claimant and Respondent,

Case No.
12180

vs.

GEORGE STANLEY,

AppeUant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
The facts are adequately stated in the Appellant's
Brief and will not be repeated here.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
This reply brief will discuss the following points
argued in the Respondent's Brief.
I. The doctrine of res judicata has no application to

this case.
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2. Liberalized rules of pleading have not supplanted
basic jurisdictional requirements.
3. Rule 59 ( e) has no application to a void judgment
and the appellant has complied with Rule 60 ( b) .
4. There was no trial of the issues raised by the
cross-claim.
ARGUMENT

1.
THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDIC.AT A
HAS NO APPLICATION TO THIS CASE.
The doctrine of res judicata is that an existing final
judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction, on matters within its jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or privies in all actions or suits in any tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction
on points and matters in the first suit.
50 C.J.S. section 592, p. 11
Matthews v. Matthews, 102 Utah 428, 132 P.2d.
Ill

Virginia Ry and Power Co. v. Leland, 143 Va. 920,
129 S.E. 700
The doctrine has no application to this case because
the court had no jurisdiction of the person of George
Stanley on the cross-claim or of the subject matter of the
cross-claim. In the original suit of W. P. Harlin Con-
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struction Company v. The Continental Bank & Trust
Company, et al, George Stanley was named in the complaint, was served with a summons and he litigated in
the trial court and on appeal the rights of the plaintiff
against him, but there are no pleadings, no service of
process and there has been no litigation of the issues of
the distinct and separate case between the bank and
George Stanley personally on the cross-claim. There
were no findings of fact on the issues raised by the crossclaim against Stanley Title Company and, of course,
there were none against George Stanley personally because he was not a party (R. 181-187). The transcript in
the original case shows conclusively that the only issues
tried were those created by the complaint of Harlin, the
answers and counterclaims of the defendants Stanley
Title Company and George Stanley and the answer of
the bank. The findings of fact in the main case cover
issues between Harlin and the bank and Harlin and
Stanley Title Company and George Stanley. The findings and the decree entered thereon relate only to the
main case and do not cover the only issue pleaded on the
cross-claim which is the unjust enrichment of Stanley
Title Company (R. 19). This pleading contained only
a conclusion of law and did not state a cause of action
against anyone.

2.
LIBERALIZED RULES OF PLEADING
HA VE NOT SUPPLANTED BASIC JURISDICTION AL REQUIREMENTS.
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It is argued in the respondenfs brief, p. 6, that
George Stanley's motion to vacate the judgment was on
the sole ground that the court lacked jurisdiction over
the person. It states, "no claim was then made that the
court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter .
The motion states:
"Comes now George Stanley, also known as
George B. Stanley, and appearing specially for
the purpose of this motion and not otherwise,
moves to vacate that certain Judgment in the
above cause dated February 26, 1970 in favor of
the Continental Bank and Trust Company, crossclaimant, and against George Stanley for the
sum of $11,082.60 together with costs and accrued
interest upon and ground and for the reason that
this court had no jurisdiction of the person of
George Stanley upon the cross-claim of the Continental Bank and Trust Company and said crossclaim does not name George Stanley as a crossdefendant herein.
"This motion will be based upon the files and records of this case." (R. 669)
The concluding clause in the motion, ". . . and said
cross-claim does not name George Stanley as a cross defendant herein," states in substance, the lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter. The rule is as follows:
"In order for a court to have jurisdiction of the
subject matter, the particular issue determined
must be properly brought before it in the particular proceeding for determination."
21 C.J.S. sec. 23, p. 37.
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As stated in West v. Shurtliff, 28 Utah 337, 79 P.
180 this Court said:
"When we speak of jurisdiction of the subject
matter, we do not mean merely cognizance of the
general class of actions to which the action in
question belongs, but we also mean legal power
to pass upon and decide the particular contention
which the judgment assumes to settle, and how
can a court acquire jurisdiction of the particular
contention except it be clearly marked out and
precisely defined by the pleadings of the parties?
And how can that be done in any mode known to
the law save by formation of a regular issue?"
The statement in the motion to vacate that " ... said
cross-claim does not name George Stanley as a crossdefendant herein," clearly pleads lack of jurisdiction of
the subject matter.
Further, a judgment is absolutely void if it is shown
that there was either lack of jurisdiction of the person or
of the subject matter. See citations in appellant's brief,
p. 10.
The liberalized rules of civil procedure do not write
out of the law the basic jurisdictional requirements discussed in the case of West v. Shurtliff, supra. It is said
that:
"Jurisdiction is distinguished from procedure in
that 'jurisdiction' relates to the court or forum
that may hear and determine a controversy and
'procedure' relates to the form or manner of conducting the suit."
.Mahoning Valley R. Co. v. Santoro, 93 Ohio St.
53, 112 N.E. 190.
5

21 C ..J .S. sec. 15 c., p. 33.
On the principle that jurisdiction must be invoked
according to proper procedure, this court stated in State
v. Telford, 93 Utah 228, 72 P.2d. 626 at 627:
"A tribunal may have jurisdiction of a subject
matter but the right to proceed under that jurisdiction may depend upon a condition precedent.
Put it another way, the court may have jurisdiction of the subject matter but its jurisdiction
should be properly invoked.
"There are many cases where courts have jurisdiction of a subject matter but that jurisdiction
must be invoked according to a certain procedure.
In invoking the jurisdiction of the district court
on matters wherein it has original jurisdiction, it
requires a complaint, petition or application. One
cannot invoke the jurisdiction by simply stating
orally one's complaint."
See also, In re Rogers' Estate, 75 Utah 290, 284
P. 992.
In view of the foregoing, the respondent's argument
that Rule 15 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
has supplanted the definitions of jurisdiction over the
subject matter is patently unsound. The rule relates to
procedure and not to jurisdiction.

8.
RULE 59(e) HAS NO APPLICATION TO
A VOID .JUDGMENT AND THE APPELLANT
HAS COMPLIED WITH RULE 60 (b).
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The respondent contends that the appellant failed
to take timely action to set aside the judgment against
him citing Rule 59 ( e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
This rule provides :
"A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall
be served not later than 10 days after entry of the
judgment."
The rule obviously refers to alteration and amendment of valid judgments, and is not intended to and indeed does not supersede the well settled rule that a
judgment void on its face may be vacated on motion at
any time. See cases cited appellant's brief pp. 9, 10.
The respondent cites Rule 60 (b) to support its
contention that the motion to vacate the judgment
should have been filed within a "reasonable time" after
entry of the judgment. The judgment in the main case
was contingent upon the payment of the amount due by
Continental Bank. A motion filed to set aside the conditional judgment before payment would have been premature. The judgment in the main case was appealed
and was not affirmed until January 22, 1970. The conditional judgment was not made absolute until February 26, 1970, by entry of the judgment on the crossclaim. George Stanley appeared specially and moved to
vacate this judgment less than two months thereafter.
This is, of course, less than the three month time limit
provided in Rule 60 (b) for seeking to set aside judgments for such reasons as mistake, newly discovered evidence and fraud. The motion was also filed within three
'
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months after the affirmance of the judgment in the main
case. (Judgment affirmed January 22, 1970-motion
filed April 20, 1970.)
We submit there has been full compliance with
Rule 60(b).

4.
THERE WAS NO TRIAL OF THE ISSUES
RAISED BY THE CROSS-CLAIM.
We have found in the record only two references
to the cross-claim. The first reference was at the time the
attorneys stated who they represented. We quote:
"Mr. Colton: Albert J. Colton. I represent the
defendant, Continental Bank; defendant and
cross claimant." (R. 218)
The second reference was made at the close of the
plaintiff's evidence in connection with the bank's motion
to dismiss.
"Mr. Colton: If the Court please, I would like at
this time to move to dismiss on behalf of the defendant, Continental Bank, on the basis of the
testimony that has been admitted to date on behalf of plaintiff's case. The Court is aware the
bank's position is a multiple one.
"First of all, of course, we see ourselves as a middleman. Resolution of course that that is if Mr.
Harlin recovers against Mr. Stanley we would
contend that we would, therefore, be entitled if
he were to recover against us we would be en-
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titled to cross claim against 1\-lr. Stanley and recover from him or if indeed Mr. Stanley is successful in his defense, there would be no damage
and we would be eliminated, of course. That I
can see that particular defenses would depend on
how the Court finds the facts at the end of the
case." (Emphasis added.) ( R. 417)
As indicated by Mr. Colton's statement, the intention was to consider the issues on the cross-claim after
the court made findings of fact on the main case. If, as
he stated, the court had decided the issues in the main
case in favor of Stanley, there would have been no damage to Continental and it would have dropped out of the
case.
There was no evidence offered in support of the
cross-claim, designated by counsel as such, and therefore
there was no occasion to attack the legal sufficiency of
the pleading or to raise a question as to the parties.
'Vhen the trial court decided the main case in favor
of the plaintiff and against all of the defendants, an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court. The issue in the
main case was not finally decided until the Supreme
Court affirmed. There was no consideration given by
anyone to the cross-claim until Continental paid the
judgment. Then, without notice to George Stanley or
to the Stanley Title Company, the bank presented to the
court a form of judgment against Stanley Title Company and George Stanley. Until such payment the alleged contingent claim in favor of the bank had not
ripened into an actionable claim and nobody-attorneys
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or trial court-had paid any attention to the sufficiency
of, or the parties to, the cross-claim.
As indicated by Mr. Colton in his statement to the
court, quoted above, there was no issue to try on the
cross-claim until the final determination of the main
case. He correctly stated the law. The case of Greene et
al v. Knox et al, Adams v. Continental National Bank,
71 Utah 217, 263 P. 928 is in point. It involved a crossclaim against Continental Bank for damages which
might in the future be sustained by the cross-claimant
on bonds signed for the benefit of the bank. The Court
said:
". . . It is certainly essential as a ground of recovery upon such a contract of indemnity to show
a loss by the complaining party. In appellant's
own brief when discussing the statute of limitation (a point not here urged by respondent) , his
counsel say:

"'Until the amount of Adams' liability on the
bond is established, of course he cannot sue the
bank. If he were never sued upon this bond, no
cause of action could accrue to him as against the
bank. When Adams is sued, he can demand that
the security be applied according to the contract
with the bank. But, until he has suffered damages, he has no cause of action against the bank.' "
There was no issue to try on the cross-claim until
the final decision on the main case, there were no pleadings naming George Stanley as cross-defendant, and
there was in fact, no trial. Respondent's argument that
George Stanley personally participated in the trial on
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the cross-claim is entirely unsupported by the recor<l
and is without merit.

CONCLUSION
The Continental Bank's judgment against George
Stanley was absolutely void because of lack of service of
process and the lack of a cross-claim naming him as a defendant. The first ruling of the trial court vacating thf·
judgment was correct and the second order reinstating
the void judgment is erroneous and should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

SKEEN AND SKEEN
E. J. Skeen
Attorneys for Appellant
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